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5	Attorney for Mr. X	
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8	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR LANE COUNTY	
9	IN THE SINGSH COSIN C	THE STATE OF SALESSATION EXIVE SOCIATION
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11	STATE OF OREGON,	
	Plaintiff,	CASE No. 20-14-
12	-VS-	MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
13	MR. X,	MOTION FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE
14	Defendant	
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16	COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through counsel Terri Wood, and submits	
17	the following points and authorities in support of his Motion For Downward Departure: 1. Court's Authority To Depart: Mr. X's presumptive sentence under Oregon's sentencing guidelines is 15-18 months imprisonment. There is no plea agreement	
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21	between the parties as to sentence. ORS ORS 137.671 and OAR 213-008-0001 both	
22	provide that the Court shall in	mpose the presumptive sentence unless it finds
23	substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure; if the Court departs, it must	
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25	state those reasons on the record at the time of sentencing.	

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DOWNWARD DEPARTURE

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The decision to depart, based on valid departure factors, is discretionary with the court. *See, Gall v. United States*, 552 US 38 (2007)(where trial court based mitigated departure on valid factor, appellate court should affirm the trial court's valid exercise of discretion); *State v. Wilson*, 111 Or App 147, 149 (1992)(Appeals court reviews the sentencing court's factual basis for departing, not its decision whether to depart). However, valid departures are a two-step process: First, determining whether the facts establish the mitigating factor(s); second, finding the factor(s) to be substantial and compelling so as to justify a departure. *See, State v. Upton*, 339 Or 673, 681 (2005)(discussing upward departures).

2. Procedural Requirements In Imposing Downward Departures: The evidence code does not apply in sentencing hearings. OEC 101(4)(d). ORS 137.090 instructs the court, in determining aggravation or mitigation, to consider "any evidence received during the proceeding; [t]he presentence report, where one is available; and any other evidence relevant to aggravation or mitigation that the court finds trustworthy and reliable." Aggravated departure factors generally must be submitted to the jury using the reasonable doubt standard. Mr. X has agreed to waive jury and consent to trial by court on the aggravating factor alleged by the State, should the State elect to proceed.

OAR 213-008-0002 sets out a "non-exclusive list of mitigating and aggravating factors that may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist." In the case at bar, the Defense has given notice that four of the enumerated mitigating factors apply, as well as three factors not contained

in the non-exclusive list of OAR 213-008-0002. A court needs only one valid factor to depart. *State v. Wilson*, 111 Or App at 151 n.4 (1992)(discussing upward departure).

The State has given notice of one aggravating factor—one that is not listed in the rule. The Court has discretion to decide to depart on the basis of mitigating or aggravating factors other than those set out in OAR 213-008-0002. *See, e.g., State v. Orsi*, 108 Or App 176, 180 (1991). The validity of nonenumerated aggravated factors remain subject to certain constitutional attacks, outside the scope of this Memorandum.

Mitigating factors do not affect a defendant's due process and jury trial rights.

Therefore, the jury trial and pleading requirements required for aggravating factors are inapplicable to mitigation.

3. Defendant's Mitigating Factors:

1) OAR 213-008-002(1)(a)(C), Defendant's mental capacity was diminished. Based upon Dr. _____ psychological report, and Mr. X's eligibility for _____ programs, there should be no dispute that this factor applies. Mr. X's IQ scores place him in the one percentile, meaning 99 percent of the adult population scores higher than him. Although traditionally tied to IQ scores, intellectual disability is a thinking or reasoning disorder, characterized by the inability to recognize and avoid risk. The intellectually disabled adult has severe adaptive behavior problems in social judgment, social understanding, and other areas of adaptive functioning. S. Greenspan & G.W. Woods, "Intellectual disability as a disorder of reasoning and judgment: the gradual move away from intelligence quotient-ceilings," <u>Curr Opin Psychiatry</u> 2014, 27:110-116 (copy

attached). The defense submits that these facts, which are integral to the nonenumerated mitigating factors in this case as well, provide a substantial and compelling reason for a downward departure.

- 2) OAR 213-008-002(1)(a)(F), Defendant cooperated with the state with respect to the current crime of conviction, by consenting to the search, voluntarily disclosing the location of firearms, showing remorse, and timely entering a guilty plea. Application of this factor does not require cooperation in the form of testimony against a co-defendant. *See, State v. Hays*, 155 Or App 41 (1998)(affirming downward dispositional departure where defendant cooperated with authorities investigating his own culpability, and later stood trial; remorse is not required). The defense submits that Mr. X's cooperation, remorse, and timely acceptance of responsibility for his conduct make recidivism less likely.
- 3) OAR 213-008-002(1)(a)(G), Degree of harm is significantly less than typical for such an offense, given that the guns were stored unloaded, in an outbuilding at Defendant's personal residence, and not possessed in connection with any other felonious activity (e.g., drug trafficking, theft). The typical felon in possession of a firearm case involves possession of the gun to facilitate commission of another offense, such as a drug deal, burglary, robbery, or assault. Significantly, Mr. X has no arrests or convictions for any such crimes. The typical case involves the firearm being transported outside the felon's residence, as well as being loaded and ready to fire. See generally, State v. Rhoades, 210 Or App 280 (2006)(court departed downward from life sentence to 60 months prison where defendant's prior sex crimes convictions

arose from single course of conduct; defendant was on post-prison supervision at the time of last conviction).

- 4) OAR 213-008-002(1)(a)(I) Defendant is amenable to treatment through [agency name deleted] supervision and programs, which have already commenced, and which are likely to be more effective than the presumptive prison term in reducing recidivism; and probation will serve community safety interests by promoting reformation of Defendant's social skills and interpersonal relationships, and ensuring he lives in a safe environment.
- 5) Defendant is particularly vulnerable to abuse in a prison environment due to mental retardation/intellectual disabilities. Federal courts have long recognized that individual characteristics that make a defendant particularly vulnerable to abuse in prison are valid grounds for downward departures. See, e.g., *United States v. Parish*, 308 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2002; *United States v. Lara*, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1990); *United States v. Long*, 977 F.2d 1264, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1992) (a physical impairment may make a defendant unusually vulnerable to abuse in prison and warrant a downward departure); *United States v. Gonzalez*, 945 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1991) (downward departure affirmed where the defendant had "soft" and "feminine" features that would make him prey to other prisoners).
- 6) Defendant's intellectual disabilities will preclude him from participating in prison programs designed for rehabilitation, as well as programs with early release incentives, causing him to serve a greater portion of his sentence than the non-

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impaired inmate. Mr. _____Declaration, as well as Dr._____'s report, support this factor.

- 7) Defendant's intellectual disabilities will likely cause him to run afoul of prisoner conduct codes, resulting in extended periods of solitary confinement, either for protection or as punishment, which is known to cause severe mental health problems even in prisoners without pre-existing mental health issues. Mr._____''s Declaration, as well as the consensus of mental health experts who have studied the effects of solitary confinement, support this factor. See, e.g., Grassian, S. & N. Friedman, "Efffects of sensory deprivation in psychiatric seclusion and solitary confinement," <u>International Journal of Law and Psychiatry</u>, 18, 1, 15-26 (1995)(finding such conditions often induce psychosis and other serious psychiatric symptoms, including massive free-floating anxiety, hyper-vigilance, acute confusional states, emergence of primitive and aggressive fantasies, paranoia, and violent destructive outbursts or self-mutilation); In re Medley, 134 US 169, 168 (1890)("[a] considerable number of prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semifatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.").
- 4. <u>Sentencing Options:</u> The presumptive term of probation for grid block 6 offenses is 3 years. The Court may impose up to 5 years probation for grid block 6 offenses by way of departure. OAR 213-005-0008(2)(b)(judge may by departure

impose a greater term of supervised probation when necessary to ensure that the conditions and purposes of probation are met). If the Court imposes probation as a dispositional departure, the defense has no objection to a 5-year term of probation, as that option is part of the defense argument that a dispositional departure presents a better guarantee of community safety than a far shorter presumptive prison sentence.

As to the pending probation violation, revocation would result in a maximum of 60 days incarceration and two years of post-prison supervision. The incarcerative term would be served in the county jail. The defense urges the Court to impose a short period of incarceration as a sanction, due to the seriousness of his conduct, but continue Mr. X on probation and extend the term. Mr.X's jail sentence is likely to be served in conditions similar to solitary confinement, i.e., maximum custody, given the challenges his several mental disorders pose to placing him in general population. Therefore, incarceration should be brief for the same reasons argued in support of downward departure. OAR 213-005-0008(2)(a) allows extending the term up to a total of 5 years based upon a violation of probation.

Keeping Mr. X on probation on both the new case and the existing probation case will afford the Court the greatest flexibility and control in dealing with any future violations of supervision. There may be some bumps along the way, but the current

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2	level of combined [agency name deleted] and Probation supervision, as well as Mr. X's
3	strong desire to avoid jail, much less prison, should provide a reasonable guarantee
4	against future criminal conduct.
5	RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7 th day of July, 2014.
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9	TERRI WOOD, OSB #883325 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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